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ABSTRACT

Legal scholars said the National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley decision would create a
“chilling effect” in government subsidy programs, and it unlawfully expanded the government
speech doctrine. By analyzing cases that subsequently use Finley for a substantive part of their
rationale, this article argues the opposite: the courts have rejected the government’s attempts to
interpret the decision as one that allows viewpoint discrimination and have not allowed the
government to further a broad reading of the decision. The article also argues that, under the
government speech doctrine, Finley provides the controlling precedent for truly “hybrid speech”
cases where the government and private voices are equally responsible for the speech that occurs.
These cases involve an “excellence criteria,” in which private voices are selectively chosen by the
government. In these cases, the Finley rationale should apply.

v

I. Introduction
On June 29, 1990, a year after New York Senator Alphonse D’Amato ripped up Andres
Serrano’s exhibition catalog and threw the pieces in front of the Senate, 1 National Endowment
for the Arts Chairman John Frohnmayer rejected grant applications for four solo performance
artists whom the NEA advisory panel had unanimously recommended for funding because their
work was considered too controversial and without artistic merit.2 The artists sued, beginning
one of the most disputed cases in recent Supreme Court history.
Scholars decried the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision to uphold Congress’ restrictions on
the NEA in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,3 and those denouncements fell roughly into
two categories. The first group argued that the clause asking the NEA to consider general
standards of decency and respect in grant decisions would chill artistic and individual
expression.4 They argued that the “artful” compromise that saved the NEA also gutted its ability
to fund worthwhile artistic expression because “decency and respect” were politics, the antithesis

135 Cong. Rec. S5594 (daily ed. May 18, 1989). Sen. D’Amato said, “Mr. President, several weeks
ago, I began to receive a number of letters, phone calls, and postcards … concerning artwork by
Andres Serrano. They express a feeling of shock, of outrage, and anger… I am somewhat
reluctant to utter its title. This so‐called piece of art is a deplorable, despicable display of
vulgarity. The artwork in question is a photograph of the crucifix submerged in the artist’s
urine.” See e.g., Kim Shipley. Comment: The Politicization of Art: The National Endowment for the
Arts, the First Amendment, and Senator Helms. 40 EMORY L.J. 241, 241 (1991) (observing that the
distinction between the right of free speech and the privilege of subsidization to facilitate free
speech is such that subsidized expression is accorded less First Amendment protection).
1

2

Boston Globe, July 12, 1990, at 74, col. 5.

3

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).

Kristine M. Cunnane. Note: Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley. 31 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (1999) (“The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
holding essentially invited government censorship wherever public funds flow. This significantly
threatens the First Amendment rights of American citizens.”); See also Gary Allison. Symposium:
The Cultural War over NEA Funding: Illogical Statutory Deconstruction Erodes Expressive Freedom. 34
TULSA L.J. 233 (1999) (“…the majority’s solution produces the worst First Amendment
consequences. It hints at an outrageous expansion of government‐as‐speaker doctrine.”); Eric
4

1

of art.5 Justice O’Connor’s arguments were disingenuous, they argued, it relied superficially on
Rust v. Sullivan,6 misread Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,7 failed
logical common sense, and served merely as a “rubber stamp” on Congress’s move to put a
popular restriction on the NEA.8 Artists would now shape their work to conform to whatever
parameters they thought the government would require.9 Artists whose aesthetic impulses led
them into territory that the government disfavored because of indecency or disrespect might not
even try for an NEA grant. Without the NEA to correct deficiencies in the market — since many
artists, especially controversial ones, are not commercially viable — these artists would have little
Cleary. Note: In Finley’s Wake: Forging a Viable First Amendment Approach to the Government’s
Subsidization of the Arts. 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 965 (1999) (“Both viewpoint discrimination analysis
and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine do not account for the role of funded institutions in
the process of self‐government. This failure threatens to undermine the First Amendment core
principle of preserving the marketplace of ideas.”); David Hungerford. Note: The Fallacy of Finley,
Public Fora, Viewpoint Discrimination, and the NEA. 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 249 (1999) (“The Finley
decision promotes a much more expansive view … than that to which the Court had previously
subscribed.”); Matthew Mustokoff. Note: The National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Striking a
Balance Between Art and the State or Sealing the Fate of Viewpoint Neutrality? 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 135 (1999) (“While governments are in the business of making funding decisions for the
public interest, they must not be permitted to be sophic ventriloquists who offer funding to the
full spectrum of private expression, only to hide behind the guise of a vague statutory standard
and deny substantial financial support to those artists whose viewpoints threaten hegemonic
values.”); Robert Vosburgh. Comment: Government Subsidies of Controversial Art: Dung, The Virgin
Mary, and Rudy Giuliani. 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 221 (2001) (“Particularly in the area of
artistic expression, such a furtherance of the government’s agenda is directly at odds with the
nature of a duplicitous democracy.”); Neil C. Patten. Note: The Politics of Art and the Irony of
Politics: How the Supreme Court, Congress, the NEA, and Karen Finley Misunderstand Art and Law In
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 37 HOUS. L. REV. 559 (2000) (“Clearly the Court’s decision
in Finley will have a chilling effect on artistic expression.”).
5

Patten, supra note 4, at 562.

6

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

7

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

8

Patten, supra note 4, at 585.

Id. at 597 (citing Finley, supra note 3, at 621, Souter, J., dissenting). “In the world of NEA funding,
this is so because the makers or exhibitors of potentially controversial art will either trim their
work to avoid anything likely to offend, or refrain from seeking NEA funding altogether.”
9

2

recourse to secure private funding.10 Some even argued that this viewpoint discrimination would
spill over into entertainment areas.11
Those in the second group may have agreed with the decision, or at least remained
neutral, but they rejected its logic and rationale.12 For some, the conflicting spins from both the
religious right and the American Civil Liberties Union over the Court’s decision13 seemed to
indicate that the Court “failed to articulate the precise delineation of the government’s role in
funding for the arts.”14 Others were less kind, tripping over adverbial superlatives to describe the
vacuity of the decision. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, they concluded, was one that
appeared to follow the individual rights approach, but “applied it in a wholly unpersuasive way,
clearly revealing the incoherence and disarray of the Court’s subsidized‐speech jurisprudence;”15
attempted to decide the case on the narrowest possible grounds but resulted in an opinion of

10

Id. at 597‐598 (citing Finley, supra note 3, at 622, Souter, J., dissenting).

Jay Rosenthal, “Music Industry Should Rally Against NEA Ruling,” 110 Billboard 32 (1998)
(predicting that the “overwhelming Supreme Court support for the proposition that viewpoint
discrimination is constitutional” would empower those who were trying to criminalize
“offensive” rap and popular music).
11

Stuart Taylor, Jr. Savoring Judicial Fudge. 220:3 N.Y. L. J. 2 (1998); Steven J. Heyman. Article:
State‐Supported Speech. 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1119 (1999); Randall P. Bezanson and William G. Buss.
Article: The Many Faces of Government Speech. 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); Editorial, “Art and the
First Amendment,” Washington Post, June 26, 1998, at A26; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. Article: NEA v.
Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale. 77 WASH. U.L. Q.1, 1 (1999).
12

The Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, House Speaker Newt Gingrich and the
Family Research Council praised it as a victory for common sense and decency. The ACLU
released a press release entitled, “ACLU sees silver lining in court’s ruling for funding for the
arts.” See Douglas McClennon, “Supreme Court Ruling on Decency Leaves Everybody Claiming
Victory, Seattle Post‐Intelligencer, July 6, 1998.
13

14

Taylor, supra note 12, at 2.

15

Heyman, supra note 12, at 1129.

3

almost “Sibylline obscurity;”16 created a “morass of unpredictability;”17 and was “profoundly
unclear on virtually every point.”18 It was a “masterpiece of confusion;”19 a “muddle beneath its
surface;”20 a “classically O’Connor‐esque exercise in muddled moderation, lacking elegant
analysis or memorable lines;”21 one that, from a doctrinal and theoretical standpoint, was
“extraordinarily unsatisfying;”22 and one that “made many salient points but failed to pull them
together into a coherent rationale.”23
Ultimately, Congress’ changes to the NEA funding scheme and the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision were the final compromise in a fierce battle over federal arts funding.24 So
perhaps Finley is best understood as a prudential decision validating a political compromise that
sought to, and has largely succeeded in, ending the arts funding controversy, as well as
insulating the NEA from further and possibly fatal attacks.25 As a matter of constitutional law,
however, the Court “confronted a very messy area of First Amendment jurisprudence and left it
even messier, suggesting that the Court decided to reach a result it found difficult to justify under
existing precedent and produced an opinion that through obscurity might cause as little damage

16

Id. at 1178.

17

Cleary, supra note 4, at 1007.

18

Heyman, supra note 12, at 1179‐1180.

19

Bezanson and Buss, supra note 12, at 1455.

20

Editorial, “Art and the First Amendment,” Washington Post, June 26, 1998, at A26.

21

Taylor, supra note 12, at 2.

22

Bloom, supra note 12, at 1.

23

Id. at 2.

24

Bezanson and Buss, supra note 12, at 1454.

25

Bloom, supra note 12, at 1‐2.
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as possible to the existing doctrinal framework.”26 Stuart Taylor, Jr., in his article “Savoring
Judicial Fudge,” however, argued that the decision was still preferable to the polar, ideologically
opposite positions of Justices Scalia and Souter because it kept the status quo intact.27
This article will not reopen the question of whether the Court’s ruling in Finley was right
or wrong, or whether it has chilled artistic expression in other federally funded arts programs.
Rather, it will explore how federal courts have applied the decision and whether the fears of
scholars, worried that the decision would grant the government freedom to engage in viewpoint
discrimination, have been realized.28 This article will strictly analyze expression within
government funding programs through the parameters of the courtroom and case law. By
analyzing cases since 1998 that use Finley in a substantive part of their rationale, this paper will
argue that, although the government has attempted to use it for discriminatory purposes, the
courts have distinguished it from cases involving censorship of artistic speech. The early fears of
government censorship have largely been proven wrong. Finley has, however, fallen into a line of
cases that form the government’s argument for greater leeway when it facilitates private speech.
This “hybrid speech” forum is much more ambiguous. Section II will give a brief history of the
NEA and the events that led to the case. Section III will follow the jurisprudential history of
modern government speech doctrine. Section IV will analyze 15 cases that have used Finley for
their rationale.

26

Id.

27

Taylor, supra note 12, at 2.

Whether artists are censoring themselves from the NEA, however, is a different topic, and one
outside the purview of this article. One could argue that artists are being less controversial, thus
resulting in fewer cases involving censorship. This article assumes that position is untrue and, as
will be discussed later, in the context of the culture wars, censorship issues in the arts are alive
and well.
28

5

Three of these are cases in which the government tried to use Finley to support broader
powers of viewpoint discrimination, but the courts rejected their argument and held conversely
that the government had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, or censorship.
The other 12 cases occupy a more ambiguous position within the government speech doctrine.
The question the courts asked themselves in each case was whether the government’s action was
a penalty against the speaker or simply a refusal to fund. Although that distinction is not always
clear, this section will also delineate the various court definitions of “penalty” and “refusal to
fund.” The section also will apply the case analysis from Section III and argue that, within the
most contested cases within the hybrid speech forum, Finley represents the controlling precedent.
Despite its disputed rationale, the cases that involve the presence of excellence criteria should
apply the Finley decision because it represents the middle ground between two opposing
doctrines: the right of the government to speak, and the right of private speakers to not be
discriminated against. The evidence suggests that the Finley precedent has not had, nor will not
have, a chilling effect on private expression.

6

II. Background
A. History
Although art has had a significant role in American history, funding for artists prior to
the 20th century came from only one source: the benevolence of wealthy patrons.1 It was not until
Congress created the National Endowment for the Arts in 1965, under the auspices of creative
and cultural diversity, that artists first had a federal agency dedicated to the financial support of
their craft.2 As the first federal agency dedicated to the development and support of the arts, the
NEA’s main purpose was the promotion of excellence in the arts and culture in order to fulfill a
“broadly conceived national policy of support for the arts in the United States.”3 Congress

Thomas Leff. Article: The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression? First Amendment Implication
of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan. 45 AM. U.L. REV. 353, 361‐362
(1995). Leff notes that much of artistic patronage came from aristocrats such as Benjamin
Franklin, a lifelong patron of the arts who founded the United States’ first library, first hospital,
and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Arts. Other forms of patronage came from the emerging
upper‐class, people such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, Solomon Guggenheim, John Rockefeller, J.P.
Morgan and Andrew Mellon. See also Linda A. Mellina. Note: Decency v. The Arts: And The Winner
Is … The National Endowment for the Arts? 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1999) (arguing that
the Finley decision is troubling because of the history of support for the arts and the viewpoint‐
discriminatory nature of the decency and respect clause).
1

See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89‐209, 2, 79
Stat. 845 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 951‐959 (1994)) This Act also established the
National Council on the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Federal Council
on the Arts and Humanities, and the Institute of Museum Services. For an in‐depth account of the
formation and regulations of the NEA, and the underlying rationale and political pressures
concomitant with a national cultural policy, see Kevin Mulcahy and Margaret Wyzomirski,
America’s Commitment to Culture, 1995. See, generally, Michael Brenson. Visionaries and Outcasts:
The NEA, Congress, and the Place of the Visual Arts in America (2001); Mellina, supra note 29, at 1517.
2

See 20 U.S.C. § 954(a). Congress explained the role of the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities as follows:
(10) It is vital to a democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural artistic heritage as well as
support new ideas, and therefore it is essential to provide financial assistance to its artists and the
organizations that support their work.
(11) To fulfill its educational mission, achieve an orderly continuation of free society, and provide
models of excellence to the American people, the Federal Government must transmit the
achievement and values of civilization from the past via the present to the future, and make
widely available the greatest achievements of art.
3

7

declared that the government’s help was necessary to “create and sustain not only a climate
encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry, but also the material conditions
facilitating the release of this creative talent.”4 In response to concerns that government support
for the arts might lead to attempts at political control of culture, Congress took steps to protect
the agency from political pressures and shield private grantees’ speech from government
control.5 It formed the NEA as an agency composed of professionals in the arts who would base
funding on artistic merit — an agency where art experts would make the funding decisions
rather than politicians.6 It gave the NEA substantial discretion to award grants by identifying
broad funding priorities, such as artistic and cultural significance, emphasis on American
creativity, and professional excellence.7 Grant applications were to be reviewed by advisory
panels, which in turn would make recommendations to the NEA Chairperson.8 Thus, Congress’s

Cunnane, supra note 4, at1447; Constance Hofland, Case Comment: Constitutional Law – First
Amendment – Freedom of Speech: The National Endowment for the Arts Can Require Consideration of
“Decency and Respect” in Funding Decisions Without Abridging Freedom of Speech. 75 N. DAK. L. REV.
893, 894 (1999) (arguing that the decency and respect clause, in the context of the NEA’s mission,
was acceptable criteria, but the courts should not use the provision to aim at the suppression of
ideas).
4

20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994).

5

20 U.S.C. § 953(c) (1994).

6

20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1994).

7

See 20 U.S.C. 954(c) (1)‐(10) (1994); Hofland, supra note 31.

See 20 U.S.C. 959(c) (1994). NEA panels were expected to avoid the problems associated with
some New Deals arts programs by offering advice informed by “neutral competence,” rather
than politics or ideology. Instead of insulating public funding for the arts from partisan or
ideological interference, however, the panels system stood accused of imposing its minoritarian
cultural values on the American public. During the 1990 reauthorization hearings, the panels
were the subject of persistent attention. The main criticism was that the NEA maintained a
system of advisory panels that was exclusive and incestuous, composed of individuals from a
small number of cultural centers who shared similar aesthetic values and who promoted each
other’s artistic interests and careers. See Kevin Mulcahy, “The Public Interest and Arts Policy,”
America’s Commitment to Culture, supra note 30, at 212, 218.
8

8

intent was to have government assistance to facilitate public participation, not serve as a
substitute for public participation or as a determining factor in what would be produced. The
funding decisions would be left to the artists and the panels.9 And until 1989, the NEA operated
smoothly, with only a few formal complaints about funding decisions.10
B. Mapplethorpe and Serrano
The incidents that led to the controversy in the 1990s have been described in detail
elsewhere,11 thus only a brief description is necessary here. Two grants in particular led to the
public controversy in 1989 and Congress’ subsequent revaluation of the NEA’s funding
procedure.12 The NEA gave $30,000 to the Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of
Pennsylvania to present a posthumous retrospective of works from the artist Robert
Mapplethorpe, titled “The Perfect Moment.”13 The exhibit consisted primarily of Mapplethorpe’s
well‐known photographs of flowers and celebrities, but also included photographs depicting
various acts of sadomasochistic homosexual activity and photographs of a young girl with her

See 111 Cong. Rec. H23969 (1965) (Cong. Monagan responding that government “will supply
the money, but the artists and their organizations will suggest the proposals … and do all the
planning.”). 111 Cong. Rec. H23665 (1965) (Rep. Annunzio stating, “Government support of the
arts and humanities is not to replace private initiative, reduce private responsibility, or restrict
artistic freedom.”). Cunnane, supra note 4, at 1449.
9

10

Finley, supra note 3, at 574.

John H. Garvey. Black and White Images. 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 189 (1993); Cleary, supra
note 4; Mellina, supra note 29; Shipley, supra note 1; Renee Linton. Comment: The Artistic Voice: Is It
in Danger of Being Silenced? 32 CAL. W.L. REV. 195 (1995); See generally, Wendy Steiner, The Scandal
of Pleasure, The University of Chicago Press (1995).

11

12

Finley, supra note 3, at 574.

13

Id.

9

vagina exposed.14 The other grant was awarded to the Southeast Center for Contemporary Art.
SECCA, in turn, then awarded Andres Serrano $15,000, which he used to produce a photograph
of a crucifix immersed in urine, titled “Piss Christ.”15 The controversy gained momentum in April
1989, when the executive director of the American Family Association discovered that the NEA
had funded an exhibit that included Serrano’s photograph.16 The Religious Right clamored for the
complete abolition of the NEA and began a write‐in program to alert its elected representatives.17
On Thursday, May 18, 1989, Senator Alfonse D’Amato took the floor of the U.S. Senate with
Serrano’s catalog.18 Within 15 minutes, 38 senators had signed a letter to the NEA condemning
SECCA’s display of Serrano’s photograph and demanded an overhaul of the NEA’s 25‐year‐old
federal funding disbursement procedure.19 Senators Jesse Helms and D’Amato led the charge:20
“The so‐called ‘art’ that I have been opposing and continue to oppose and will oppose until we
cut off funding for it, is so rotten, so crude, so disgusting, so filthy, that it turns the stomach of

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Garvey, supra note 39 at 190‐191.

17

Id.

135 Cong. Rec. S5594 (daily ed. May 18, 1989). “I have a catalog of the show and Senators you
need to see it to believe it,” Senator D’Amato said. “This is not a question of free speech. This is a
question of abuse of taxpayer’s money. If we allow this group of so‐called art experts to get away
with this, to defame us and to use our money, well, then we do not deserve to be in office.”
Shipley, supra note 1, at 241.
18

19

135 Cong. Rec. at S5595.

135 Cong. Rec. S5594 (daily ed. May 18, 1989). “I do not know Mr. Andres Seranno (sic), and I
hope I never meet him. Because he is not an artist, he is a jerk” (Helms statement). Of
Mapplethorpe, Sen. Helms said, “His exhibit endangered Federal funding for the arts because the
patently offensive collection of homo‐erotic pornography and sexually explicit nudes of children
was put together with the help of a $30,000 grant from the Endowment…”
20

10

any normal person,” Helms said.21 This war cry pitted political conservatives against progressive
artists in the culture wars.22
The Helms amendment originally sought to prohibit the funding of “obscene” and
“indecent” works of art, “material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents of a
particular or nonreligion” and “material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or
class of citizens on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age or national origin.”23 A federal
district court invalidated his amendment under the First and Fifth Amendments.24 When
Congress considered reevaluating the NEA’s funding priorities in the appropriations for fiscal
year 1990, members first eliminated $45,000 from the agency’s budget — the exact amount
contributed by the NEA to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano shows.25 Congress then created an
independent commission of constitutional law scholars to advise Congress on permissible
restrictions on NEA funding to “assess the possibility of more focused standards for public arts
funding.”26 The Commission’s report, issued in September 1990, suggested procedural changes
and cautioned against legislation setting forth any content restrictions.27 With the Commission’s
recommendations in hand, Congress considered a variety of amendments. The House rejected
one amendment that proposed further content‐based restrictions, and another that would have

21

137 Cong. Rec. 23,464 (1991) (Sen. Helms’ statement).

22

Cleary, supra note 4, at 965; Mellina, supra note 29, at 1518; Linton, supra note 39, at 202.

23

135 Cong. Rec. S8862 (daily ed. July 26, 1989).

24

Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (1991).

25

Finley, supra note 3, at 574‐575.

26

Id. at 575.

27

Id.

11

eliminated the NEA altogether.28 Ultimately, Congress adopted a bipartisan compromise between
members favoring some NEA guidance and those opposing any funding restriction.29
In September 1990, Congress adopted several of the changes recommended by the
Commission and added the “decency and respect” clause, which gave a mandate to the NEA
Chairperson to ensure that:
1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged,
taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs
and values of the American public; and
2) applications are consistent with the purpose of this section. Such regulations shall
clearly indicate that obscenity is without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall
not be funded.30

In December 1990, the NEA implemented the resolution, but only after interpreting the clause to
mean that members of advisory panels would represent geographic, ethnic, and aesthetic
diversity.31
Shortly before Congress passed the “decency and respect” clause, NEA Chairman
Frohnmayer denied fellowships to four solo performance artists ‐‐ Karen Finley, John Fleck,
Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller ‐‐ against the unanimous recommendations of an NEA Peer
Advisory Panel.32 The artists subsequently filed suit. All had been described as “radical” artists –
the work of Fleck, Hughes, and Miller contained homosexual themes, while Finley’s
performances addressed subjects like rape and incest.33 After the NEA adopted Section 954(d)(1),

28

Id. at 576; See also 136 Cong. Rec. 28656‐28657 (1990).

29

Id.

30

20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1994).

31

Id.

32

Finley, supra note 3, at 577.

12

the plaintiffs, joined by the National Association of Artists’ Orgaizations (NAAO), amended their
lawsuit to challenge the clause, arguing it was impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment,
and violated the First Amendment on its face by imposing content‐based restrictions on protected
speech.34
Two years later, the NEA still faced heavy scrutiny from the government and artists
alike,35 and in June 1992, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted
summary judgment in favor of the artists.36 On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed that judgment.37 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and on June 25, 1998,
More specifically, Karen Finley, in her show “We Keep Our Victims Ready,” smears her semi‐
nude body with chocolate, which is supposed to look like excrement while recounting a sexual
assault in graphic terms. Holly Hughes’ monologue “World Without End” is a recollection of her
realization of her lesbianism and memories of her mother’s sexuality. John Fleck’s performance
consists of urination on stage while putting a photograph of Jesus Christ on the lid of a toilet. He
also simulates masturbation. Tim Miller uses vegetables to represent sexual symbols and
recounts his life as a homosexual living with the threat of AIDS. Finley, supra note 3, at 596 (Scalia,
J., concurring); William H. Honan, “Judge Overrules Decency Statute,” N.Y. Times, June 10, 1992,
at A1.
33

34

Finley, supra note 3, at 569, 577‐578.

In 1989, Frohnmayer had already revoked a $10,000 grant to the Artists Space, a New York
gallery. The grant had been awarded by the NEA to fund an AIDS exhibit entitled, “Witnesses:
Against Our Vanishing.” Frohmayer decided to revoke the grant solely on the exhibit’s political
content, arguing that the exhibition had changed its focus after the grant had been approved. The
arts community cried censorship, included Leonard Bernstein, who threatened to refuse the
Presidential Medal of the Arts in protest, despite the fact that President Bush was scheduled to
present him the award that week. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, Sect. 2, at 1, col. 1; Shipley, supra
note 1, at 244.
In 1992, the NEA’s advisory council was accused of content‐based disapproval of two grants.
Both grants involved sexually explicit visual materials that were a part of the applicants’ overall
applications, one by a “bastion of avant‐garde art” Franklin Furnace in which the performer
invited an audience member to rub lotion over her nude body. The other application by
Highways in Los Angeles contained 25 homoerotic photographs, some of them of men engaged
in oral sex. Even though the panels were rarely overturned, the NEA argued that the applications
were denied on artistic merit. Later, the new NEA chairperson admitted the she had overturned
the recommendations of NEA expert advisors said she was acting to keep Congress from
dismantling the NEA. See Kim Masters, “Arts Agency Rejects 2 Grants; Chairman Questions ‘In
Your Face’ Tactics,” Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1992, at D1. See also Kim Masters, “NEA Chief
Defends Grant Vetoes; Further Conflict Likely, Radice Says,” Washington Post, May 29, 1992, at
D1; Allison, supra note 4, at 258‐259.
35
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almost eight years to the day after Frohnmayer’s decision to overrule the panels, the Court
reversed the lower courts’ decisions in an 8‐1 vote, upholding the “decency and respect” clause.38

36

Finley, supra note 4, at 569.

37

Id. at 578‐579.

38

Id. at 569.
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III. Legal Relevance
A. Context of the Culture Wars
During the Mapplethorpe and Serrano controversy, Congress operated under two
interests: to protect citizens from offensive speech, and to protect taxpayers from unwanted
expenditures.1 Critics have argued that conservative Congress members have used the
“taxpayer’s money” slogan unfairly in order to suppress unwanted speech.2 And although the
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down the “taxpayer’s money” premise,3 legislators have
used that slogan to galvanize constituents, especially when Congress has funded programs to
which a large, vocal number of voters object.
The Religious Right appeared in the late 1970s, reacting to the hedonism, feminism, and
war protests of that era, especially the series of court decisions legalizing abortion and outlawing
mandatory prayer in schools.4 Jerry Falwell, Jimmy Swaggart, Pat Robertson, Tim La Haye, the
Moral Majority and the Religious Rountable took over the personal evangelism begun by Billy
Graham and steered it sharply to the political right.5 Generally, it opposes issues such as

1

Linton, supra note 39, at 214.

Dan Mayer. The Religious Right and Arts Funding, 21 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 341, 344 (1992). In April
1991, at a hearing held by the House Appropriations Interior Subcommittee, Reverend Sheldon
said, “There is a war raging in America…The elitist avant‐garde arts community uses the NEA to
advertise and disseminate their political beliefs. The NEA then uses our scarce tax dollars to fund
works which are intended to shock Americans into an acceptance of dysfunctional behavioral
lifestyles and to destroy the family.” See also statements by Sen. D’Amato, supra note 46. Linton,
supra note 39, at 217.
2

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (ruling that virtually every congressional appropriation will to
some extent involve using public money to promote policies to which some taxpayers may
object); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (ruling that taxpayer money may be
sued to promote views on public radio with which they may disagree). Voters do not have a
constitutionally protected right to enjoin those expenditures to which they object, nor could that
interest be invoked to justify a congressional decision to suppress speech. Id. at 385. Linton, supra
note 39, at 214‐216.
3

4

Tom Sine. Cease Fire: Searching for Sanity in America’s Culture Wars, Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, (1995).
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gay rights, safe sex education, abortion, separation of church and state, and affirmative action. It
is in each of these policy arenas that conservatives and liberals engage in what James Davison
Hunter calls “culture wars” and Ken Meier calls “morality politics.”6 They are disputes grounded
in moral concerns, rooted in deep‐seated moral values. Social conservatives are attracted to these
issues largely because proposals or existing practices are viewed as an affront to religious belief
or a violation of a fundamental moral code. They can take sides on easily summarized positions.
The often extraordinarily passionate debates about morality policy involve uncompromising
clashes over values, and activists in culture war issues are typically galvanized in ways that make
compromise difficult.7
And it seems that even today, the culture wars are alive and well — even taking over the
courts, according to no less a personage than Justice Scalia. In his vitriolic dissent from the
Lawrence v. Texas8 decision in 2003, he wrote: “One of the most revealing statements in today’s
opinion is the Court’s grim warning that the criminalization of homosexual conduct is ‘an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.’ It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its

Id. at 16‐17. The most visible part of the reborn conservative movement was Pat Robertson’s
Christian Coalition. Since it was founded in October 1989, this organization dedicated to
conservative political action has reportedly garnered a mailing list of over 30 million and an
active membership of over 1.5 million. The Christian Coalition, having learned from the failure of
the religious right during the 80s to shape national policy, shifted its focus to influencing politics
on the local level.
5

Elaine B. Sharp, ed. Culture Wars and Local Politics. “Introduction,” by Elaine B. Sharp. University
Press of Kansas, 1999. Elaine B. Sharp, page 3) See also James Davison Hunter. Culture Wars. New
York: Basic Books, 1991. See also Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public
Policy. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, p. 7, 1994.
6

7

Hunter, supra note 72.

8

Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”9
Supreme Court nominee and conservative critic Robert Bork agreed. Writing a year earlier, Bork
bemoaned the lack of responsibility that judges have taken: “We lawyers all feel diminished
because our contribution to cultural collapse has not been recognized. The role of courts in the
culture wars, too, is often overlooked … Since about 1950 we have had a Supreme Court that has
gone into high gear with activist decisions ... what hangs in the balance in our culture war is
nothing less than the civilization of the West.10 Legal conservative Bradley Watson also agreed
that the culture wars have spilled over into the courts. “In the routinely occurring seesaw battles
that result in 5‐4 or 6‐3 outcomes from a bench unchastened by a sense of modesty about its
purpose, limits, or the changed circumstances in which it operates, the Court’s members become
the prime culture warriors in our society,” he wrote.11
Even those who are less strident agree that the confusion in the Finley decision was
exacerbated by the fact that it was a product of a cultural war, between those who espouse
traditional religious values and artists who portray various aspects of alternative sexual choices
and feminist critiques.12 The Supreme Court’s decision was part of a larger debate over

9

Id. at 2496‐2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Robert Bork, “Courts and the Culture Wars,” Courts and the Culture Wars, Bradley C.S. Watson,
ed. p. 4‐5. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002.

10

Bradley C.S. Watson, “Introduction,” Courts and the Culture Wars, Bradley C.S. Watson, ed., p.
xiii, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002.

11

Marjorie Heins, Sex, Sins, and Blasphemy: A Guide to America’s Censorship Wars 5 (1993). She
discusses several contributing factors to the art crisis, including the problem of scapegoating
speech for social ills. Typically, this is a breeding ground for those who want to distract attention
from social ills by attacking artists and other dissenters. Another is an American distrust of
cultural elites and academics. See also Lewis Hyde, “The Children of John Adams: A Historical
View of the Fight Over Arts Funding,” Art Matters: How the Culture Wars Changed America, Brian
Wallis, ed., (1999); Linton, supra note 39, at 202.
12
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indecency, not just in the fine arts, but in film, television, books and the Internet,13 even if it was
an essentially symbolic skirmish in the culture wars. It gave both sides their soapbox moment,
while “letting the NEA get back to its usually benign if boring business of funding orchestras and
the like.”14 The Court avoided a collision between two vital principles that can co‐exist only if
neither is carried to the limits of its logic, resulting in an ambiguous, inconclusive muddle, but
one — again— preferable to the extremism of Scalia and Souter.15
And since Finley, almost all decisions that use its rationale feature contentious, highly
emotional issues — abortion funding, gay rights, animal rights, hate speech, Internet
pornography, and religion in the public sphere — where the citizenry disagrees with the use of
public money because it disagrees with the speech that the money has advanced. With the return
of these cultural controversies like gay marriage and “innocent victims” laws to the forefront of
political campaigns in this election year, a discussion of the application of Finley seems highly
appropriate.
B. The government speech doctrine
Finley now resides within the government speech doctrine, although the Supreme
Court’s decision significantly broadened the doctrine when it decided the case. At its core, the
government speech doctrine states that the government does not infringe on citizens’ First

Joan Bikuspic. “’Decency’ Can Be Weighed in Arts Agency’s Funding,” Washington Post, June
26, 1998, at A1.

13

14

Taylor, supra note 12, at 2.

15

Id.
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Amendment rights when it simply chooses not to subsidize private expression out of public
funds.16 As long as the government is not discriminating “invidiously” in its subsidies to “aim at
the suppression of dangerous ideas,” it has broad power to choose which groups receive funds.17
Seven years before Finley, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the government
speech doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan,18 where, in a 5‐4 decision, it upheld a federal law denying
funding to family planning clinics that provided abortion counseling.19 In what would become
known as the government‐as‐speaker doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
held that the government could selectively fund one program without funding an alternative
program that addressed the problem in another way.20 Government subsidies are, after all,
discriminatory by nature, the Court stated. If the government wanted to encourage childbirth
over abortion, it had the right to fund those programs that encouraged childbirth. “In so doing,
the government had not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint,” Rehnquist argued.21 It had
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.22 In other words, this was merely

Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding the IRS’ denial of TWR’s
application for tax‐exemption on the grounds that much of their work would consist of lobbying,
something not allowed by 501(c)(3) status. The Court held that the regulations were viewpoint‐
neutral and that TWR could establish an affiliate to lobby on its behalf without a tax subsidy.).
16

Id. at 548, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 513, 519 (1958) (in which veteran’s benefits were
denied to those who refused to swear they did not advocate the violent overthrow of the
government). The Court found no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas
or any demonstration to that effect. Rehnquist argued that when government subsidies were not
aimed at the suppression of ideas, its power was broader. Id. at 544; Buckley, supra note 69; Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
17

18

Rust, supra note 6.

19

Id. at 173.

20

Id. at 193.

21

Id.
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a refusal to fund — not a penalty. Justice Blackmun, however, in his dissent, argued that the Rust
regulations were clearly viewpoint‐based because they only targeted those who provided
abortion counseling, creating an unconstitutional condition for grant receipt.23 Rust epitomized
the difficulty in determining the difference between a penalty and a mere refusal to fund.
The Court distinguished Rust four years later in another 5‐4 decision, Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,24 which held that a university could not
discriminate against students who wanted to produce a religious publication using student
funds. This time, viewpoint discrimination was unconstitutional because the university had
created a limited public forum, then penalized students with religious viewpoints by not
allowing them to participate.25 In this case, the government entity had not enlisted private

22

Id.

Id. at 207‐208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions finds its
precedent in Speiser, supra note 83, at 518‐519, in which veteran’s benefits were denied to those
who refused to swear they did not advocate the violent overthrow of the government. The
doctrine holds that the government may not predicate the receipt of a grant in order to forfeit
one’s constitutional rights, or, the government may not penalize their employees by reducing
their First Amendment rights. “To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech … The denial is ‘frankly aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,’” (quoting American Communications Assn. V. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402 (1950).
23

24

Rosenberger, supra note 7.

Id. at 829‐830. The public forum doctrine received its sharpest elucidation in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The Court developed three
categories of fora: the traditional public forum, usually any public land where the government
has allowed open discourse, such as a park or sidewalk; the limited public forum, limited to a
certain class of speakers for whom the forum was designed, such as a university’s bulletin board
for students; and last, the nonpublic forum, the most restrictive forum, which is usually a limited
forum but must be narrowed in order to maintain the original purpose of the forum, like a lecture
series at a university that cannot accommodate every student who attends the university.
Viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional in any forum.
25

20

speakers to convey its own message, but had rather allocated funds “to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers.”26
Thus, prior to Finley, Rust and Rosenberger were the two shaky cornerstones on which the
government speech doctrine teetered. On one side, Rust held that the government has broad
authority over content when the government itself is the speaker, and either directly or indirectly,
has a message to convey. On the other side, Rosenberger ruled that when the government allocates
funding or space for diverse private expression, the rights of private speakers are paramount. The
government cannot set up a forum for expression and then discriminate. Viewpoint
discrimination is unconstitutional in any forum.
It should not be surprising that the Court’s rationale in Finley, then, would be disputed.
Based on the contentious decisions in Rust and Rosenberger, the Court obviously had a difficult
time establishing the parameters of the government speech doctrine. On top of that, Finley is
neither wholly like either Rust or Rosenberger, but rather somewhere in the middle. At first glance,
it would appear that Rosenberger should control Finley, since the NEA was encouraging private
speech. But Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, distinguished Rosenberger, arguing that the
competitive process involved in the NEA grant‐making procedure made Finley different because
the NEA was not encouraging a diversity of speakers but rather a very select group of speakers.27
Thus, she applied Rust, even though it was equally clear that the government was not speaking
through the NEA. In the context of selective subsidies, O’Connor argued, Congress could not
always legislate with clarity, and the decency and respect clause merely added some imprecise
considerations to an already subjective process.28 Additional advisory guidelines were fine

26

Id. at 833.

27

Finley, supra note 3, at 586.
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because the process, by nature, was already highly subjective. She held that the language of the
decency and respect clause was not penalizing artists because it only asked the NEA to
“consider” common standards of decency when making decisions — a narrow interpretation of
the clause.29
Two additional opinions from Finley warrant mention. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia mocked the Court for claiming the provision was not viewpoint discriminatory, and he
argued for a much broader interpretation than O’Connor’s: that viewpoint discrimination is
“perfectly constitutional” when it is expanding the use of speech through subsidies.30 Justice
Souter, in his lone dissent, agreed that the provision was viewpoint discriminatory but reached
the opposite conclusion, that Congress may not “discriminate by viewpoint in deciding who gets
the money,” once it decides to spend public funds.31 He argued that the controlling precedent
was Rosenberger, where the Court ruled that when the government acts as patron, or a facilitator
of speech, it may not prefer one lawfully stated view over another.32 It would be difficult to
argue, however, that the NEA was a limited public forum in the mold of Rosenberger, because the
panel recommendations were so highly selective. The NEA was not encouraging a diverse group
of speakers — it was encouraging a very specific type of speaker, one who had artistic excellence.
At the same time, the NEA was certainly not an arm of the government, enlisting those speakers
28

Id. at 590.

29

Id. at 580‐581.

Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Regan, supra note 82, at 549). “It is the very nature of
government to favor and disfavor points of view … None of this has anything to do with
abridging anyone’s speech.” Id. at 598. Scalia applied the Rust rationale. “Avant‐garde artistes …
remain entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the addition satisfaction of
having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it. … It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer
subsidy with measures ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas’” Id. at 596.
30

31

Id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).

32

Id. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to convey a governmental message. It existed is the nether regions somewhere between Rust and
Rosenberger.
Although Justice Souter glossed over the excellence criteria, which was the primary
difference between Rosenberger and Finley, his dissent was still largely consistent with current
doctrine and under different circumstances might have attracted a majority of the Court.33 Yet he
failed to round up even one additional vote. At least one scholar felt that the Court rejected an
all‐or‐nothing approach that might kill arts funding altogether because that decision would result
in greatly diminished participation by the artistic community.34 The simplest, common‐sense
explanation of the Finley opinion is that a majority of the court examined the existing state of
affairs at the NEA, concluded that it worked well enough and decided to leave it alone. The
majority opinion, then, seems to be an attempt to preserve the status quo and minimize any long‐
term damage to First Amendment doctrine. Once the Court releases an opinion, however, it
cannot control how it will be used by judges in future cases, much less how lower federal and
circuit courts will use it.35
This ambiguity within the government speech doctrine has led to the idea of the
government as patron, or government as editor, as in Arkansas Educational Television Commission
v. Forbes.36 This category, however, is equally problematic because, as Randall Bezanson argued,
“…the very enterprise of drawing a line between government as manager/regulator and

33

Bloom, supra note 12, at 23.

34

Allison, supra note 4, at 264.

35

Bloom, supra note 12, at 26.

Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (concerning a state
public television commission’s ability to select participants in a political debate); Finley, supra
note 3, at 569 (“when the government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe”).

36

23

government as speaker is fraught with danger.”37 Broad categories like “government‐as‐patron”
are rarely inclusive. The government speech doctrine tends to resist categorization, and instead
resembles shifting sand in which judges must draw lines.38 At any rate, Finley rests firmly in the
government speech doctrine, and the courts must engage the decision whenever any subsidized
speech is at issue, not just artistic speech. Some elements appear relatively settled. When the
government itself seeks to convey a message, either directly or through private surrogates, it will
be allowed to control what is said.39 There is also general agreement that when the government
funds expression, it has wide latitude over aspects of content (such as subject matter) that the
Court regards as relatively neutral.40 On the other hand, viewpoint discrimination is
impermissible in programs that ostensibly support a diversity of private expression.41 As the
government conceded, NEA grants are not intended to enlist private speakers to convey a
governmental message; hence, the case is not one of government speech.42 Yet the Court applied
the Rust government speech rationale in Finley, and this inconsistent application of the doctrine
has confounded courts and scholars alike.43 The Court’s government speech doctrine has become

Randall P. Bezanson. Article: The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government
Speech Selection Judgments. 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 962 (arguing that the danger is that the
government as speaker enjoys broader powers of discretion, and without proper guidelines to
know the difference, the Court may be investing the government with more power than it should
have).
37

38

Gay Guardian v. Ohoopee Regional Library, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1379 (2002).

39

Finley, supra note 3, at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger, supra note 7, at 833‐834.

Rust, supra note 6, at 173; Arkansas Writer’s Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237‐238 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
40

41

Finley, supra note 3, at 586.

42

Heyman, supra note 12, at 1180.

43

Vosburgh, supra note 4, at 225.
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theoretically and analytically stuck in an endless circle, “at the edge of a chasm between
government speech and the public forum.”44 The courts agree that penalties, not subsidies, allow
the government to monopolize the marketplace of ideas. Determining the difference between the
two is the ambiguous part.
In his article, “Leaving Things Undecided,” Cass Sunstein argued that the Court
sometimes writes “incompletely theorized agreements” in which it decides the case but leaves to
subsequent courts the task of explaining how the decision fits into the existing doctrinal and
theoretical framework.45 This has certainly happened with Finley. District and Circuit courts have
faltered under the weight of the government speech doctrine, their own rationales stretched
in trying to determine what constitutes a penalty and what is a mere refusal to fund. At its basic
level, a penalty occurs when the government opens a forum for expression, then closes it for
certain speakers. A refusal to fund can be two‐fold: the government can pick and choose certain
speakers to convey its message, or it can close a forum as long as it does so in a viewpoint‐neutral
manner.
It should be noted that many cases have cited the Finley precedent. This article does not
seek to outline all 78 cases that have done so. Many of them use Justice O’Connor’s definition of a
“facial challenge.”46 Others vary, using Finley to clarify minor definitions47 or to illustrate

44

Bezanson and Buss, supra note 12, at 1381.

Cass R. Sunstein. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term — Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 20‐25 (1996).
45

McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36 (2001); Spingola v. Vill. of Granville, 39 Fed. Appx. 978 (2002); New
Orleans Towing Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1550 (2000).
46

Microsoft Corp. v. United Computer Res. of N.J., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 383 (2002) (defining
“sporkin”); Marche’ v. Parrachak, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14804 (2000) (defining “chutzpah); City of
Los Angeles v. United States DOC, 307 F.3d. 859 (2002) (defining “consideration”).
47
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overbreadth or vagueness challenges.48 The cases this article examines, however, are those that
use Finley within the government speech doctrine, and specifically, 15 cases that concern
subsidized speech when the government acts as speech facilitator.
These cases fall into two categories. First, the government has attempted to use Finley to
discriminate against viewpoints and content with which it disagrees, most notably in Brooklyn
Institute v. Giuliani,49 Esperanza v. City of San Antonio,50 and United Foods Commercial Workers
Union v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority.51 In all three cases, however, the courts
distinguished the government’s broad application of Finley and held that under the Supreme
Court’s narrow rationale, the government could not discriminate according to viewpoint.52 The
feared “invidious discrimination,” at least from the judicial side, has not occurred.
The second line of cases are neither solely the government’s speech nor solely private,
but a “hybrid speech of both.”53 Within these 12 cases, there are three general categories: when
the government is primarily responsible for the speech, when private speakers are primarily
responsible, and when responsibility cannot be fully determined. These cases include expression

Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Schs, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17639 (2003) (“vagueness”); King Enters
v. Thomas Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891 (2002) (“vagueness”); Commodity Trend Serv. v. CFTC, 149 F.3d
679 (1998) (“overbreadth”); Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (2003) (“overbreadth”).

48

Brooklyn Institute of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York and Rudolph W. Giuliani, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184
(1999).
49

50

Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6259 (2001).

United Foods Commercial Workers Union v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority, 163 F.3d 341
(1998).
51

52

Brooklyn, supra note 115, at 53‐54; Esperanza, supra note 116, at 62; Id. at 356.

Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. DMV, 305F.3d 241, 245 (2002) (Luttig, J.,
concurring in respect to a denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that the speech at issue is neither
exclusively private or exclusively government, but rather, a “hybrid speech of both”).

53
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in library lobbies54 and computers,55 city parks56 and parades,57 courtrooms,58 and license plates,59
among others. It may be helpful to think of these cases along a continuum. Purely government
speech would constitute one end of the spectrum and purely private speech would be on the
opposite end. None of the cases within the Finley universe are completely on one end or
the other, but rather occupy various points along this continuum.

Figure 1.
The government speech doctrine schema

“excellence” criteria
government speech

public forum

Rust
FINLEY
Government‐as‐speaker
|
refusal to fund
|
|
Gay Guardian
|
PETA
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| (Gov. primarily responsible)
|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
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Diversity of views
penalty
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
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(Private voices primarily responsible)|
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DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558 (2001).
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People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2000).
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Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. DMV, 288 F.3d 610 (2002).

27

Although the government will always use Finley in its attempt for greater discrimination
over the speech it facilitates, this article will argue that Finley is particularly applicable in the
third category, the purely “hybrid” cases, which are in the middle of this continuum. As in Finley,
however, the question of whether a government action constitutes a penalty or a mere refusal to
fund is still the determining factor, and the Supreme Court has left it up to the lower courts to
decide this difference for themselves.
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IV. Case Analysis
A. Three Attempts to Penalize Viewpoints

It is true that the Brooklyn and Esperanza cases are fairly straightforward examples of First
Amendment violation.1 New York District Judge Nina Gershon and San Antonio District Judge
Orlando Garcia both immediately recognized the pertinent question: Whether the government
can engage in viewpoint discrimination within its funding programs.2 The answer, from both
judges, was a resounding no. Sixth Circuit Judge Karen Moore, though not ruling in an arts
funding matter in UFCW, also recognized that a government entity, in her case a public transit
authority, could not engage in viewpoint discrimination once it had decided to fund private
voices.3
In Brooklyn, the city of New York, acting with Mayor Giuliani, argued that it had the right
to eject the Brooklyn Museum from public land solely on its perception of an artwork’s content in
the “Sensation” exhibit, and that the First Amendment did not prohibit them from refusing to
subsidize artworks that were offensive and “religiously intolerant.”4 In Esperanza, the city of San

1

Vosburgh, supra note 4, at 223.

Esperanza, supra note 116, at 39. (Garcia, J., “Having noted that the City cannot discriminate
against an arts organization based on its viewpoint, the Court must next decide whether the City
actually did so.”)
2

UFCW, supra note 117, at 361. (Moore, J., “We therefore must carefully examine whether the
advertising policy’s prohibition conceivably could lead SORTA’s officials to reject a proposed
advertisement because of the viewpoint expressed, a power they do not have under the First
Amendment.”)
3

Brooklyn, supra note 115, at 193. Mayor Giuliani argued, “You don’t have a right to a subsidy to
desecrate someone else’s religion. And therefore we will do everything that we can to remove
funding from the [museum] until the director comes to his senses and realizes that if you are a
government subsidized enterprise, then you can’t do things that desecrate the most personal and
deeply held views of the people in society.” Id. at 191. The mayor, an outspoken Catholic,
defended his decision to terminate funding for the museum based largely on Ofili’s portrait of
the Virgin Mary, which used elephant dung as one of its materials. There were small
4
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Antonio argued that it could refuse funding to arts organizations that “advocated a gay and
lesbian lifestyle” in order to appease a public that disagreed with that message.5
Both cities asked the courts to apply Finley, arguing that the Court’s ruling permitted
viewpoint discrimination in subsidizing the arts. Both Gershon and Garcia rejected this
interpretation of Finley, calling that reliance on Finley “misplaced”6 and “mistaken,”7 because
Finley made it “crystal clear that viewpoint discrimination in subsidy programs was not
permissible.”8 The only reason the decency and respect clause was constitutional was because the
Court interpreted it as merely advisory and not permitting viewpoint discrimination.9 Although
Finley did allow the government considerable discretion to fund programs that have competitive
selection criteria like arts programs, this action was constitutional only “so long as

photographs of buttocks and female genitalia scattered on the background as well. See also W.J.T.
Mitchell, “Offending Images,” Unsettling “Sensation”: Arts‐Policy Lessons from the Brooklyn Museum
of Art Controversy. Laurence Rothfield, ed. (2001).
Esperanza, supra note 116, at 15‐16. These accusations came primarily from conservative
Christian groups. During August and early September 1997, Christian talk‐radio host Adam
McManus undertook radio and lobbying effort to oppose City funding for Esperanza, and he
interviewed several council members on his program. Martha Breeden, executive director of the
Christian Pro‐Life Foundation, sent a flyer to about 1,200 people on the mailing list urging
opposition to City funding for Esperanza because she opposed the City funding a gay and
lesbian program. Most council members received letters and phone calls. One member said the
opposition calls he had received were mean and vicious, with callers threatening to vote against
him and have their families, neighbors, and churches do the same if he voted to fund the
plaintiffs. The council voted to defund those arts organizations entirely, the only organizations to
lose all their funding. Id. at 18‐22.
5

6

Brooklyn, supra note 115, at 202.

7

Esperanza, supra note 116, at 61.

Id. at 60 (quoting Finley, supra note 3, at 587 (“even in the provision of subsidies, the
Government may not ‘aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas…”) (quoting Regan, supra note
81, at 550).
8

9

Brooklyn, supra note 115, at 202.
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legislation did not infringe on other constitutionally protected rights…”10 In Brooklyn and
Esperanza, however, the government engaged in obvious and egregious penalization of particular
viewpoints. This, the courts ruled, was unconstitutional.
Judge Moore also interpreted Finley on narrow grounds in UFCW v. SORTA, ruling that
an advertising policy that prohibited “controversial” ads was unconstitutional because it would
vest the government entity with an “impermissible degree of discretion.”11 SORTA had refused a
bus advertisement for United Foods Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) after its members held
a protest and used the buses to carry union members to and from the protest.12 Moore applied
Finley’s argument that vague terms like “decency” and “respect,” and in this case, “controversial”
would raise concerns as part of a regulatory, as opposed to a funding, scheme.13 The policy’s
broad prohibition against “controversial” advertisements would, she concluded, chill expressive
activity.
What was clear from the two arts cases is that both cities attempted to penalize grant
recipients because of their content or viewpoint expressed. Clearly, neither case passes
constitutional muster. It is interesting to note, however, that the government tried to apply
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Finley — a broad, overreaching interpretation of the case — to its
own. Both judges rejected this interpretation of Finley and instead, applied O’Connor’s narrow
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Finley, supra note 3, at 588; Esperanza, supra note 116, at 61‐62.

UFCW, supra note 117, at 359 (quoting Finley, supra note 3, at 569). Judge Moore ruled that
SORTA’s advertising policy was vague and clearly regulatory in nature. Id. at 360 (ruling that the
advertising Policy invited “subjective or discriminatory enforcement” by allowing the
government to speculate the amount of impact a controversial advertisement may have).
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Id. at 346‐347.
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Id. at 360.
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ruling. UFCW was decided a mere six months after Finley, and Moore, with an opportunity to
grant governmental entities more discretion regarding a vague term such as “controversial,”
refused to do so and applied the Finley rationale against broad government speech rights.
Where Finley has been more contested has been in the area of “hybrid speech,” in which
the government provides a forum for speech indirectly and when governmental penalties on
speech are less direct.
B. “Hybrid Speech”
The lower courts, to whom the Supreme Court has left the decision to formulate the
jurisprudence for the government speech doctrine, have been outspoken about having no real
precedent to follow.14 They complain that the Court has spoken in terms that are “remarkably
open‐ended” and that they, as judges, cannot acknowledge the government speech doctrine
“without also expressing … serious reservations about its undefined and open‐ended nature.”15
Especially difficult for judges is the nebulous nature of forum analysis. The hybrid nature of
government/private collaborations has rendered forum analysis a torturous exercise for the
courts. The Gay Guardian v. Ohoopee Regional Library court, unable to comfortably designate the
library lobby either a limited forum or a nonpublic forum, gave up and called it a “hybrid
limited/nonpublic forum.”16 The District Court in PETA v. Giuliani was equally flummoxed. “To
say that the ambiguities described have left this Court benumbed and bewildered is only
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Gay Guardian, supra note 104; PETA, supra note 123; Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra note 119.

15

R. J. Reynolds v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1101 (2003).

Gay Guardian, supra note 104, at 1370. The court went on to ask rhetorically whether their
decision would ultimately repress speech. “Such questions make lawyers rich and law reviews
thick. Judges, meanwhile, must draw lines in the shifting sands of First Amendment law.” Id. at
1379.
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modestly overstated.”17 In Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of the Va. DMV, the court also
bemoaned the dearth of clear doctrine, saying “No clear standard has yet been enunciated in our
circuit or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is ‘speaking’ and thus
able to draw viewpoint‐based distinctions…”18 That court, at the denial of an en banc rehearing,
also labeled the government/private collaboration a “hybrid speech.”19 Scholars such as Leslie
Gielow Jacobs have tried to reconcile the hybrid speech conundrum, arguing that
“disentangling” government speech from private speech is much more difficult than sterile
doctrinal categories will allow.20 The “real‐life manifestations” are less clear.21 Jacobs suggests
looking at who is “primarily responsible” for the speech.22 Most hybrid speech, by definition, will
include a volatile mixture of private and government expression, and the 12 cases within the
Finley universe of hybrid speech demonstrate that it is sometimes easier to categorize cases by
whether the speech is “primarily” private or governmental. This section explores the depths of
this continuum.
1. When the Government Is Primarily Responsible
In all subsidized speech cases, the courts must answer two questions. First, whose speech
is it? Is it primarily the government’s speech or has the government opened a forum for private
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PETA, supra note 123, at 300.
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Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra note 125, at 618.
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Sons of Confederate Veterans, supra note 119, at 245 (rehearing en banc denied).

Leslie Gielow Jacobs. Article: Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government Speech and Private Speech,
36 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 35 (2002).
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Id. at 35.
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Id. at 43‐55.
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expression? In four cases within the Finley universe, the courts ruled that the government was
“opening up its own mouth.”23 These cases follow the Rust rationale. In Downs v. Los Angeles
Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit decided that the First Amendment did not compel a
public high school to share the podium with a teacher with antagonistic and contrary views when
the school had decided to speak.24 The school board, quite clearly, sought to convey messages of
tolerance towards gays and lesbians and had no obligation to allow a teacher to contradict its
message. In United States v. American Library Association, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a
plurality opinion, that the government could refuse funding for libraries that refused to install
Internet pornography filtering software on their computers, in accordance with the Children’s
Internet Protection Act.25 Congress also had an agenda — to limit children’s access to
pornography on library computers, and it enacted CIPA to further this goal by deciding to refuse
to fund libraries that did not install Internet filtering software. The other two cases — R.J.
Reynolds v. Bonta26 and Summit Medical Center v. Riley27 — were obvious instances of

23

Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 228 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2000).

Id. at 1005. The Los Angeles School District had issued a memorandum to the public schools
designating the month of June as “a time to focus on gay and lesbian issues” and would provide
posters and materials for school bulletin boards in support of Gay and Lesbian Awareness
Month. Robert Downs, a teacher, objected to the recognition of Gay and Lesbian Awareness
Month and created his own bulletin board titled “Redefining the Family” across the hall from his
classroom. He posted portions of the Declaration of Independence, newspaper articles and
excerpts from Bible verses denouncing homosexuality, statements regarding the immorality of
homosexuality, and quotes arguing that the anatomical structures of men and women indicate
that they were made for each other. Id. at 1005‐1007.
24

25

American Library Association, supra note 121.

Bonta, supra note 140. California imposed a tax, approved by California citizens, on tobacco
wholesalers and providers in order to fund their anti‐smoking campaign.
26

Summit Medical Center v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (2003). Alabama charged abortion
providers a fee, which would provide the revenue to produce videos and pamphlets encouraging
childbirth over abortion.
27

34

government speech, since they both involved the government imposing taxes and fees on private
entities to fund government programs with which these private speakers disagreed.
The second question, then, is to what extent can the government control its speech when
it is speaking? Once the courts have determined that the government itself is primarily
responsible for the speech, the government is granted wide latitude to discriminate according to
viewpoint or content when the government itself is the speaker. Three factors play a pivotal role,
in descending importance: first, alternative channels must exist for expression outside the
government forum. Second, the government should be able to prove it has a compelling interest
as justification for the speech restrictions. Last and least, democratic alternatives should be
available for the private speakers to choose different elected representatives If these conditions
apply, the government may pick and choose which programs it wishes to subsidize and which
expression it will allow. Penalization is difficult to prove when the government is primarily
responsible for the expression. Downs represents the clearest example of this within the Finley
universe, where the anti‐gay teacher asked the court to apply Rosenberger. The court instead
applied Rust, ruling that “simply because the government opens its mouth to speak does not give
every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to play ventriloquist.”28 Since the
school district had not opened a forum for private expression, it could decide “that Downs may
not speak as its representative.”29 The court cited Finley in that it upheld government rights when
it controls its speech. Though perhaps not exactly what Justice Scalia had in mind when he
wrote his concurring opinion in Finley, the Ninth Circuit applied his reasoning to Downs: “It is the
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view…”30
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Downs, supra note 148, at 1013.
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Likewise, the Supreme Court in American Library Association applied the Finley and Rust
rationale and distinguished Rosenberger because the “broad discretion” involved in making grant
decisions was analogous to public libraries making collection decisions.31 The government was
not encouraging a diversity of speakers, but rather advocating a specific position. It was
impossible for libraries to surrender First Amendment rights, the Court argued, because, as
governmental entities, they do not have First Amendment rights.32 Congress was merely insisting,
by refusing to fund those libraries that disagreed with its message, that the funds be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized.33 The government’s action, importantly, also would
fulfill a compelling interest — to protect children from pornography.
The other two cases, Bonta and Riley, illustrate the limitations of government speech even
when it is the speaker, namely, the government cannot force private speakers to convey a
message with which they disagree. In Bonta, a district court held that California’s voter‐approved
policy of charging a tax on cigarette wholesalers in order to fund anti‐smoking campaigns was
constitutional. 34 Bonta, however, stands out as the anomaly in the Finley universe, relying heavily
on the fact that the voters had approved the tax, rather than whether the tax severely abridged
the tobacco companies’ speech. It should have applied the rationale of Riley, a similar
case, in which a district court in Alabama held that the state’s direct fee on abortion providers to
pay for anti‐abortion materials was unconstitutional.35
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31

American Library Association, supra note 121, at 2304.
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Id. at 2308.
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Bonta, supra note 140, at 1085.
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Riley, supra note 152, at 1353‐1354.
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The Bonta court held that the government had not opened a forum for a diversity of
opinion, and using the Downs rationale, determined correctly that the government was primarily
responsible for the advertisements.36 The court argued that the government had instituted the
tax for a specific purpose, to advocate an anti‐smoking lifestyle, and therefore had wide latitude
to discriminate against expression.37 The court, however, wrongly applied the Supreme Court
decision Board of Regents v. Southworth38 ruling, which held that the government, when advancing
its own policies, is accountable to the electorate and that “newly elected officials later could
espouse some different or contrary positions.”39 The court cited Scalia’s assertion that the
government could have many instances in which it is required to take a side and advocate a
position. The government also had a compelling interest: working toward saving the state $5.6
billion a year in health care costs related to smoking‐related illnesses.40
Riley got right what Bonta got wrong. Although the Bonta court made many salient
points, it failed to recognize that Southworth was a case of a university charging a fee in order to
open a viewpoint‐neutral forum for diverse opinions. The Riley court conceded that the
government could use tax revenue and fees and put them to any particular purpose in order to
govern effectively, even though citizens may disagree with the message content.41 The court also

Bonta, supra note 140, at 1100 (quoting Downs, supra note 148, at 1011‐1012) (ruling that because
the bulletin board material was directly traceable to the school district, the school was responsible
for the speech and could choose not to speak or speak “through the very act of removal” of
adversarial materials from its hallways).
36
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Id. at 1101.
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allowed that Finley held that it was the very business of government to favor and disfavor points
of view.42 The government had crossed the line, however, by not only advocating a position, but
by charging a direct fee on those private speakers who disagreed with the government’s
position.43 The government action, at that point, moved beyond a mere refusal to fund speech it
found objectionable, but exacted a penalty on it. And that, Riley held, was unconstitutional.
Bonta’s reliance on the citizen vote that agreed to the tax vested the government with too much
power to punish views.44 First Amendment rights are not majority votes.
Downs and American Library Association represent the position that the government can
refuse to fund certain expression or refuse to allow certain expression to take place if it has a
particular program it is advocating. The government has merely refused to fund certain types of
speech on the basis that it does not fit in the program the government is advocating. Bonta and
Riley rest on the other side of the continuum, ruling that private speaker cannot be penalized for
their views. The government went beyond merely refusing to fund them. It actively required
payment to fund speech that they found objectionable.
2. When Private Voices Are Primarily Responsible
Private expression is primarily responsible when the government seeks to create a forum
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Finley, supra note 3, at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Riley, supra note 152, at 1360. “The State has interfered with the Plaintiff’s free speech rights by
compelling them to contribute money that is subsequently used to fund government speech that
the Plaintiffs find objectionable.” Id.
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Bonta also relies superficially on Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Finley, in which he uses
anti‐smoking campaign as an example when the government can advocate a position without
advocating the alternative. Souter, however, says nothing about charging tobacco companies to
fund those positions. Finley, supra note 3, at 610‐611 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The government is of
course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination: if the Food and Drug Administration
launches an advertising campaign on the subject of smoking, it may condemn the habit without
also having to show a cowboy taking a puff on the opposite page.”).
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to include a diversity of viewpoints. Although determining this purpose is sometimes
contentious,45 the cases within the Finley universe bear out that when the government extends
itself into the private sphere to allow for diverse viewpoints, it may not discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint in a way that would drive certain ideas out of the marketplace. These cases apply
forum analysis and the Rosenberger rationale. The government can set content‐neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on fora that it creates, but viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional in
any forum.
Board of Regents v. Southworth is the least contentious example of this side of the Finley
continuum. In Southworth, the Court held that a public university could, under the First
Amendment, charge students a mandatory student activity fee that is used to fund a program to
facilitate free and open exchange of student speech that is viewpoint‐neutral and engaged in
religious, political, and social subjects.46 In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, the United States
Supreme Court held that Congress’ denial of funding to lawyers who represented indigent
clients’ attempt to change or modify existing welfare law was unconstitutional.47 Both programs,
the Court argued, were designed to facilitate discussion from a diversity of speakers. In
Southworth, the school had protected the speech rights of objecting students in two ways: it made
the funding viewpoint‐neutral and allowed for funding or defunding based on a majority vote
from the students. The court rejected the government speech doctrine laid out in Rust and
applied Rosenberger because the university was not advancing a particular message but rather
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Southworth, supra note 164, at 217.
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fostering viewpoint‐neutral expression for its students.48 Velazquez, a much more contentious
case, differed from a case like American Library Association, a case where the Court upheld
funding denials, in three ways: the government had a specific and compelling interest when it
enacted the Children’s Internet Protection Act at issue in American Library Association. Second,
lawyers and their clients were private speakers, not government entities, and third, the subsidies
were designed to help those who could not normally afford legal counsel. Unlike Rust, the
majority argued, “There may be no alternative source of vital information … where a person
could receive both governmentally subsidized counseling and consultation.”49 The majority
rejected the dissent’s argument that the denial of a subsidy does not “coerce belief,”50 and held
that the denial of subsidy designed for indigent populations would in fact drive ideas from the
marketplace.51
Two other cases reside in the “primarily private” side of the continuum, and both involve
the relationship of the government speech doctrine to the Establishment Clause, just like
Rosenberger. Not surprisingly, both cases sought to apply Rosenberger to their case. In Gentala v.
Tucson, the Ninth Circuit decided that a city should not be required, using tax funds and public
employees, to provide funding for a religious organization’s prayer service held in a local park.52
The city did not stop the Prayer Committee from holding its prayer service in the park, but the
organizers wanted the city to cover $340 worth of lighting and sound equipment, the fee for
which the city charges groups who want to use it.53 By contrast, the DeBoer v. Oak Park case serves
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Southworth, supra note 164, at 218.

49

Velazquez, supra note 124, at 536.
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as the opposite of Gentala.54 The DeBoers were denied access to a public hall for their National
Day of Prayer activities, as opposed to the Gentalas denial of funding.55 The Seventh
Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling that the activities were not “civic” enough and that
the Oak Park’s Use Policy was viewpoint‐discriminatory because it denied access in a viewpoint‐
discriminatory manner, making forum analysis irrelevant.56 Citing Finley and Rosenberger, the
court held that Oak Park could not penalize the expression of particular views.57 But in Gentala,
the court cited the line of reasoning from Rust in Finley, holding that the government was
involved in a communicative activity and was afforded a degree of viewpoint selection criteria,
or selectivity, when dispensing funds.58 Along the imaginary continuum, the courts drew a line
between allowing a religious organization access to a public forum and funding a religious
organization’s activities in a public park. The difference between a penalty and a refusal to fund
was the difference between access and funding.
3. When Responsibility Cannot Be Determined
It should surprise no one that within the Finley universe, cases would cite both Rust and
Rosenberger. Finley certainly has aspects of both. Where the previous two categories fail, however,
is in the truly hybrid category. And it is here that Finley is most helpful. These four cases refute
simple categorization to determine when the government or private voices are primarily

Id. at 1067‐1068, 1070‐1071. The city often provided this equipment free of charge for various
civic organizations, but, in the case of the Gentalas’ National Day of Prayer activities, funding the
equipment would be the equivalent of “paying the church’s bills.” Id. at 1071.
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responsible, and they are the ones most like Finley. When Finley was decided, the Supreme Court
distinguished it from its closest counterpart, Rosenberger, arguing that the excellence criteria in
Finley was selective enough to keep out too many voices for it to be clearly labeled a forum for a
diversity of speakers. All four cases that follow have a level of selectivity that, if the courts had
applied the excellence criteria at issue in Finley, would have saved several ink cartridges. One
case would have been decided correctly.59 The Finley application would allow the government
greater discretion when excellence or selective criteria is involved.
Of the four cases, Gay Guardian v. Ohoopee Regional Library System is the clearest
example.60 The court upheld a library’s decision to restrict the free literature table in its lobby to
only government and library materials after receiving complaints about a gay rights publication,
“The Gay Guardian.”61 A court in New York expanded on this decision in PETA v. Giuliani,
where a district court held that the city could refuse the animal‐rights group’s display for the
Cow Parade because it was “inappropriate,” “aggressively political,” “profane,” and “too graphic
and violent” for public display in public parks and on school property, where the public at large
and of all ages would encounter it without seeking it out.62 The courts ruled in both cases that the
government could open a forum to the public and then close it solely to avoid disruption and
litigation over issues, even if viewpoint discrimination drove all or part of that decision.63
Both courts agonized over what type of forum the government had created, and both
were unable to come to a satisfactory decision.64 The forum analysis in excellence criteria cases is
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tangential at best, and is an exercise in futility most of the time. Since these cases involve funding
or space allotment, the government entity should be afforded a degree of discretion. Egregious
viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional in any forum. Both Gay Guardian and PETA held
that, as long as there were alternative channels of information,65 the government could, having
created a hybrid forum, “constitutionally close it, even with censorious intent, where the
resulting effect is content‐neutral.”66 The PETA case ostensibly only affected one group, however.
The PETA court did cite Finley for its justification that when the government establishes selective
criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in its selection judgments,67 but both courts
emphasized that the private speakers also must have alternative channels of communication. The
Gay Guardian court reasoned that the newspaper was widely read on the Internet, and librarians
could direct people to the site once in the library (though perhaps after the American Library
Association decision, people would have to ask the librarians to remove the filters as well).68 The
library, the court argued, simply chose a low‐cost, conflict‐avoiding maneuver — that of affecting
all private groups equally. The PETA members were certainly free to post their message
wherever they wanted outside the Cow Parade. They could post it mere feet away from the
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Id. at 1368 (quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F. 2d 1242, 1262 (1992) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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PETA, supra note 123, at 321 (quoting Finley, supra note 3, at 569, 589) (arguing that “when the
government acts as a patron allocating competitive grants to the arts according to legislative
criteria, First Amendment concerns somewhat analogous to those presented here frequently
arise…Inevitably, such imprecise criteria allow for the government exercise of broad discretion
and subjective judgments.”). The guidelines set up for the Cow Parade were viewpoint neutral,
the court contended, not against just PETA but against any religious, political, or sexual
expression. Id. at 321.
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forum the government had designated. Since the parade organizers had accepted one of the
designs, PETA could not prove egregious viewpoint discrimination.
In a similar case, Locke v. Davey, decided in February 2004, the Supreme Court upheld
Washington’s scholarship denial to a student seeking a theology degree.69 Davey also asked the
Court to apply Rosenberger, contending that the state’s restrictions were unconstitutional
viewpoint restrictions on speech. The majority, however, distinguished Rosenberger, arguing
that the Promise Scholarship was not a forum for speech.70 It was not designed to “encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.”71 Yet the Promise Scholarship did not wholly
encourage private expression because it was only extended to students in the top 15 percent of
their class. This excellence criteria necessarily eliminated 85 percent of the other students who
wished to partake in this forum. The Court should have applied the excellence criteria in Finley.
Although the Court reached the correct decision, it failed to articulate a clear precedent for its
decision, except to distinguish the cases that Davey sought to apply. Finley should have been that
precedent.
In Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Commissioner of Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, the
Fourth Circuit ruled the logo restriction on Virginia’s specialty license plates, which would have
prohibited the display of the Confederate flag, was unconstitutional.72 The court argued that the
logo was private speech, and although they considered the selective criteria rationale at issue in
Finley, the court held that the restriction was viewpoint discrimination because it impermissibly
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burdened the speech rights of only one speaker in the forum.73 In a 6‐5 decision to deny a
rehearing of the decision en banc, in which three judges wrote concurring opinions and two
judges wrote dissenting opinions, the majority held that though the General Assembly approved
over one hundred special plates, the Sons of Confederate Veterans plate was the only one with
design or logo restrictions. “When a legislative majority singles out a minority viewpoint in such
pointed fashion, free speech values cannot help but be implicated.”74 Again, forum analysis is
inconsequential. The Supreme Court, wrongly, “has never held that a message can be both that of
a private individual and that of the government.”75 In this case, “the forum and the message are
essentially inseparable, making it difficult, if not impossible, to separate what is indisputably
private speech act from what is indisputably government speech.76
The license plates, though an expression of a personal viewpoint, were still the property
of the government, and the court should have applied Finley. The state was not enlisting a
diversity of speakers, so the private speakers were not primarily responsible. To receive a
specialty license plate was like a reward, much like being awarded a spot in the Cow Parade, or a
Promise Scholarship. The state of Virginia allowed only 100 plates out of surely many more civic
groups and organizations, like the Promise Scholarship, which was available only to students
who were in the top 15 percent of their class. All of these criteria are highly embedded in process.
Although the Cow Parade, a Promise Scholarship, or Virginia’s specialty plate requirements are
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not as selective as an NEA grant, they require more than just filling out a form for access. All
three are the equivalent of a reward, and the courts should not treat denying a reward like a
penalty.
Sounding eerily like Scalia, one dissenting judge wrote, “Those who wish to display the
Confederate Flag logo, even on their motor vehicles, remain free to do so. They are merely
deprived of the right to demand that the Commonwealth of Virginia endorse their message by
issuing license plates containing that logo.”77 There are alternative channels for the Sons of
Confederate Veterans, and there is no evidence that their speech will be hindered. Virginia had
simply set limitations as part of its guidelines. The government, however, cannot close a forum
unless it is viewpoint neutral. This sets Sons of Confederate Veterans, PETA, Davey, and Gay
Guardian apart from Brooklyn, Esperanza, and UFCW.
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V. Conclusion
Despite all the hand‐wringing about the Finley decision when it came out, the decision
has not had as much of an adverse effect on First Amendment expression as originally thought.
The Mapplethorpe and Serrano controversies, however, did affect the NEA. One could easily
argue that the Finley decision was part of a chilling effect on artists and artistic expression since
Congress, as part of the NEA’s punishment, revoked all grants to individual artists. Perhaps this
is one reason the NEA has not had a Finley‐like scenario since then – the artists who wish to epater
les bourgeoisie know better than to apply for a federal grant.1 The NEA is being praised at the
present time for its conservative funding decisions, such as funding the works of Shakespeare. In
this sense, Finley stands as an example of a chilling effect.
The Court, however, attempted to decide the case as narrowly as possible, and mitigated
some of the potential negative results by doing so. It essentially made the best decision it could,
by taking the teeth out of the decency and respect clause and keeping the prospect of funding for
the arts intact. The courts have rejected the government’s attempts to use Finley as a tool for
censorship of unwanted speech. It should be noted, however, that the government’s actions in the
name of Finley in cases like Brooklyn and Esperanza should give everyone pause. The action that
the Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza had to take just to receive their funding should never have
been necessary. That the courts ruled in favor of the private voices is a testament to the First
Amendment.

1

Mulcahy, supra note 30, at 220. The interests of public support for the arts cannot be well served when
public arts agencies appear to support aesthetic values that are seen to be deeply at odds with the moral and
religious beliefs of a significant proportion of the public. … The balance sought is to have a public culture
that is not an official culture. The solution would seem to rest with basing public support for the arts on a
policy of cultural pluralism that recognizes the diversity of expressions of artistic excellence and respects
the autonomy of artists and the art world, while also respecting the diverse beliefs and traditions of the
American people. Id. at 224.

47

Within the hybrid speech forum, the four truly “hybrid” cases within the Finley universe
should have applied (or did apply) the selective criteria argument found in Finley. The courts
ruled in Gay Guardian and PETA that the government had created a forum for speech and could
close or limit it as long as the effect was viewpoint‐neutral, even if the intent was viewpoint‐
discriminatory.2 The government could, however, set prior limits on the speech it allowed to take
place in its own limited space. PETA could take its cow parts and plant them all along the
sidewalk if it wished, and Gay Guardian could publish and distribute the newsletter, but neither
could force the government to allow their expression where the government had already set
viewpoint‐neutral limits. This was the rationale of the Court in Finley.3 The Cow Parade was a
competition and the library by necessity ruled out certain voices. Both cases, like Finley, were
unable to come up with a definite type of forum that the government had created. In hybrid
expression, the type of forum becomes inconsequential, because the selective criteria makes it
similar to a limited public forum but not quite a nonpublic forum, rendering the three types of
fora delineated by the Court practically useless. The Promise Scholarship in Davey was also
selectively based, as were the specialty license plates in Sons of Confederate Veterans, and the courts
should have applied Finley to both because of the competitive nature of the forum.
To what extent can the government engage in viewpoint discrimination? Although the
government cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination when a diversity of views are at stake,
the government can, if the speaker, close off certain avenues if the effect if viewpoint‐neutral. If
the government is granting expression on a competitive basis, it should be able to selectively

2

Gay Guardian, supra note 104, at 1379.

3

Finley, supra note 3, at 569.
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discriminate among private speakers, so long as there are alternate channels of expression
available and the government is not usurping the market. There is no evidence that this will
abridge anyone’s speech. The irony is that what was widely held as such as a loathsome decision
five years ago, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley may be the clearest hope for discerning
the hybrid speech minefield of today.
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